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Abstract 
 
We model EU countries’ bank ratings using financial variables and allowing for intercept and 
slope heterogeneity. We find that country-specific factors (in the form of heterogeneous 
intercepts) are a crucial determinant of ratings. Whilst “new” EU countries typically have 
lower ratings than “old” EU countries, after controlling for financial variables, all countries 
are found to have significantly different intercepts, which confirms our hypothesis. This 
intercept heterogeneity may reflect differences in country risk and the legal and regulatory 
framework that banks face (such as foreclosure laws). In addition, ratings may respond 
differently to the liquidity and operating expenses to operating income variables across 
countries: typically ratings are more responsive to the former and less sensitive to the latter 
for “new” EU countries compared with “old” EU countries.  
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1. Introduction 
 
Ratings of banks and companies conducted by External Credit Assessment Institutions 
(ECAIs) may be seen as instruments that provide investors with prima facie information 
about the financial position of the subject in question and on the price of credit risk.  
Ratings are ordinal measures that should not only reflect the current financial position of 
sovereign nations, firms, banks, etc. but also provide information about their future financial 
positions. The objective of our paper is to analyse the determinants of individual bank ratings 
conducted by Fitch Ratings (FR) and to investigate whether the country of origin matters for 
individual ratings. For this purpose, we first consider whether (and which of) the key 
financial ratios of banks reflect individual ratings (that is, according to FR, a key component 
for long- and short-term rating). Second, we examine whether bank ratings are systematically 
determined by the country origin of commercial banks. One hypothesis is that FR might 
assign higher ratings to commercial banks from “old” EU countries that have the same 
financial position as those from “new” EU countries. This could reflect differences in country 
risk (given that bank ratings cannot exceed sovereign ratings) or differences in legal and 
regulatory factors (including their enforcement), such as foreclosure laws. Another 
hypothesis is that FR might set ratings differently for “old” and “new” EU countries in terms 
of response to financial factors. That is, the coefficients on financial variables in a regression 
explaining ratings may be different for “old” and “new” EU countries. 
In other words, we test if commercial banks from “new” EU countries are assigned 
ratings on the basis of their financial ratios in the same way as “old” EU countries or if other 
factors are considered. To this end, we incorporate “new” EU and country-specific indicator 
variables to capture heterogeneous variations in ratings under that rationale that a bank’s 
rating is related to the country in which it is based. As country-specific indicators we 
construct index-of-indicator variables that are in the spirit of the method applied in Hendry 
(2001) and Hendry and Santos (2005), although we extend it to allow heterogeneous slopes. 
This methodological approach has recently been proposed by Caporale et al. (2009) and 
represents a novel contribution in the context of modelling bank ratings. We also assess the 
predictive power of our model to classify the individual ratings of the commercial banks in 
question. 
The ability to predict the financial soundness of banks, corporations and sovereign 
countries has been of central importance for analysts, regulators and policy makers. A large 
number of studies have employed financial ratios to predict failures of individual firms 
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(banks), for example, Altman et al. (1977) and Ohlson (1980). Models that predict bank 
failures using so-called Early Warning Systems (EWS) have appeared in a number of studies, 
including Mayer and Pifer (1970), and Kolari et al. (2002).  Within this context, the financial 
variables of commercial banks have been utilised in several ways.   
Yet the ability of ECAIs to assign ratings correctly has been extensively questioned 
(Altman and Saunders, 1998, Levich et al., 2002, Altman and Rijken, 2004, Amato and 
Furfine, 2004, Portes, 2008). One of the most frequent arguments about the prediction 
abilities of rating agencies (RAs) is that they could provide misleading information since the 
analysis is backward- rather than forward-looking. In addition, the low transparency of 
ratings assignments contributes to the concern over the accuracy of ratings. Further, ECAIs 
do not have, and cannot have, superior information to market participants about uncertainty 
and the degree of insolvency (illiquidity) of companies. By modelling ratings we seek to 
identify their determinants and, using measures of fit, gauge how transparent ratings 
assignments are. 
There are numerous studies that predict bond ratings such as Kamstra et al. (2001),  
who utilise ordered-logit regression. Other evidence from recent studies (Kim, 2005; Huang 
et al., 2004 and Lee, 2007) show that artificial intelligence methods do not provide superior 
predictions of bond ratings compared with standard ordered-choice methods. Hence, using 
ordered logit/probit regressions is a valid way of addressing the main challenge in modelling 
ratings, which is to increase the probability of correct classifications. However, we are not 
aware of any previous studies that seek to model and predict individual bank ratings allowing 
for heterogeneous country effects, which is the aim of this paper.  
The organization of the paper is as follows. Section 2 describes the data and the 
methods applied, while Section 3 discusses the principal empirical findings. The last section 
concludes.  
 
2. Data and Methodology 
 
We model the individual ratings of EU banks as produced by Fitch Ratings (FR). 
These ratings are divided into six main categories (A, B, C, D, E, F) which, with intermediate 
subdivisions (A/B, B/C, C/D, D/E), give ten categories of bank performance. We use data on 
1168 European banks’ ratings, denoted iY , between 1996 and 2008. iY  is ordinal and has ten 
categories that are assigned integer values, 0 to 9: lower values indicate a lower rating. The 
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ten rating categories are: F (0), E (1), D/E (2), D (3), C/D (4), C (5), B/C (6), B (7), A/B (8), 
A (9).  
We apply ordered-choice estimation techniques to model this ordinal dependent 
variable because, as is well known, they are the appropriate method to use in this case. The 
ordered dependent variable model assumes the following latent variable form (see Greene, 
2008):  
 
i
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where kiX  is the k
th explanatory variable for the ith bank, iu  is a stochastic error term, and 
*
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is the unobserved dependent variable that is related to the observed dependent variable, iY , 
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where 1λ , 2λ ,…, 9λ  are unknown parameters (limit points) to be estimated with the 
coefficients (the kβ s). We are primarily interested in the general direction of correlation 
between the dependent and independent variables. Therefore, we use the sign of kβ  to 
provide guidance on whether the estimated signs of the coefficients are consistent with our a 
priori expectations. This is instead of looking at the marginal effects which indicate the 
direction of change of the dependent variable (for each value of the dependent variable) in 
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response to a change in kiX . For ordered-choice models these marginal effects are difficult to 
interpret.  
 The probit form of this model assumes that the cumulative distribution function 
employed is based upon the standard normal, while the logit form assumes a logistic 
distribution. Greene (2008) suggests that probit and logit models yield results that are very 
similar in practice and so we focus on those from the probit form.  
The first explanatory variable that we consider is for the year in which the rating was 
made [ iDate ]. This is 3 in 1996, 4 in 1997, 5 in 1998 and so on.
4 The second set of covariates 
considered is the first lagged values of the following seven financial variables: the ratio of 
equity to total assets [denoted iEquity ], the ratio of liquid assets to total assets [ iLiquidity ], 
the natural logarithm of total assets [ ( )iAssetsln ], the net interest margin [ ]iNIM , the ratio of 
operating expenses to total operating income [ iOIOE _ ], other operating income to total 
assets, [ ]iOOIA  and the return on assets [ iROA ].5 Current values of financial variables are not 
used as they may contain information not known when the rating was made.6 The choice of 
variables is guided by the past literature. 
 A third set of variables employed are country indicator (or dummy) variables. Two broad 
types of indicators are considered. First, we construct a shift dummy variable, NewiD , that is 
defined to take the value of unity for “new” EU countries and is zero for the 15 “old” EU 
countries.7 This dummy variable, multiplied by a financial variable, iZ , yields the shift in 
that variable’s slope coefficient for a “new” EU country, Newiki
New
ki DZZ ×= . Second, we 
develop index-of-indicator variables that allow each country to have different intercept and 
slope coefficients. However, an ordered-choice model incorporating 27 dummy variables for 
each covariate cannot be estimated; hence, we employ a method that is in the spirit of Hendry 
(2001) and Hendry and Santos (2005) to construct indices-of-indicator variables for each 
covariate.  
                                                 
4 Originally we had data from 1994 where 1994 took the value of 1. However, data prior to 1996 was lost due to 
missing observations on some variables. 
5 Some other variables were considered but were omitted from the analysis due to multicollinearity.   
6 For example, if a bank’s rating was decided in January 2007 then the value of any explanatory factor measured 
over the whole of 2007 would be unknown when the rating was made.  
7 The twelve “new” EU countries in our sample are: Bulgaria, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, 
Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia. The fifteen “old” EU countries are Austria, 
Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, 
Spain, Sweden and the UK. 
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 To construct a country index for the intercept we estimate two probit models, one for 
“new” EU countries and one for “old” EU countries. That is, one probit regression of ratings 
on the 12 “new” EU countries’ (intercept) dummy variables, 1,2,...,12m  , =miD , is 
estimated, thus:  
 
∑
=
=
12
1
* ˆˆ
m
mimi DY δ   (3) 
 
where, mδˆ denotes the respective estimated coefficients.  
 
 The initial index for “new” EU countries is constructed as the sum of the products of the 
coefficients for the significant variables and their corresponding dummy variables, thus:    
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 Similarly, the following ordered-choice model is fitted to the 15 “old” EU country 
dummy variables, 2713,14,...,m  , =miD : 
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 The initial index for “old” EU countries is correspondingly constructed as:   
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 To obtain a preliminary index for all countries, ratings are then regressed on these two 
indices, thus:  
 
O
iO
N
iNi IIY γγ ˆˆˆ* +=   (7) 
 
 The initial country index is constructed as: 
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 This index was checked for appropriateness by running a single regression that included 
the initial country index plus one individual country’s dummy, that is: 
 
mim
C
ii DIY αλ ˆˆˆ * +=   (9) 
 
 If the latter individual dummy variable was significant the value of its coefficient, mαˆ , 
was incorporated into the country index. This was repeated for all 27 countries, that is, 27 
regressions containing only two variables (the country index and a particular country’s 
dummy) were estimated. After all the coefficients of the individual country dummies that 
were significant in these 27 regressions had been incorporated into the index this step was 
repeated until no individual country dummies were significant at the 5% level (when included 
in a regression with the country index). The result is the intercept country index – reported in 
Table 4.   
 A modified procedure was employed to construct indices for the non-intercept 
covariates. For each covariate (except for iDate ) a slope interaction variable, 
C
kmiZ , was 
constructed as:  
 
miki
C
kmi DZZ ×=  (10) 
 
 For the kth covariate one regression is estimated for the “new” EU countries as ratings on 
the financial variables, date and the 12 “new” EU countries’ slope interaction term for the kth 
variable, thus:  
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 A corresponding regression for the kth financial variable is estimated for the group of 15 
“old” EU countries, as:  
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 Initial indices for the kth covariate for “new” and “old” EU countries are constructed 
using only the statistically significant interaction terms, as: 
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 To obtain a preliminary index of the kth covariate for all countries we regress ratings on 
these two indices, thus:  
 
O
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N
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 The initial country slope index for the kth financial variable is constructed as: 
 
O
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N
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C
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 This index was refined by the following iterative process. A single regression that 
included the date, the financial variables, the initial country index plus one individual 
country’s interaction term was estimated as follows: 
 
C
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C
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=
  (17) 
 
 If the latter individual interaction term was significant the value of its coefficient, mμˆ , 
was incorporated into the country index. This was repeated for all 27 countries. After all the 
coefficients of the individual country interaction terms that were significant in these 27 
regressions had been incorporated into the index this iteration was complete. Further 
iterations were repeated until there was convergence giving the final country slope index, 
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CF
kiI . Complete convergence would be achieved when no kmiZ  term was significant at the 5% 
level for any country in (17) in a full iteration. Convergence may also be achieved even if 
interaction variables can be added with significance between iterations if the change in the 
index is small between iterations (to some tolerance level). We found that 999 iterations was 
sufficient for all but the liquidity index to achieve complete convergence or make the changes 
between the values in the indices sufficiently small to conclude that they had converged.  For 
the liquidity index there is non-convergence such that the index is not the same between 
adjacent iterations but is exactly the same for every other iteration. In this case we tried both 
possible indices for liquidity in our regressions.8 Plots of the 998th and 999th iterations of the 
index for each of the financial variables are given in Figure 1 to Figure 7.9   
  
3. Empirical Results 
 
 The first set of ordered probit regression results for the determinants of bank ratings are 
presented in Table 1. We report a general model and one favoured parsimonious specification 
obtained using a cross-sectional variant of the general-to-specific methodology.10 When there 
was ambiguity over which model to favour we selected the model with the lowest SBC. In all 
cases the favoured parsimonious models only include variables that are individually 
significant according to z-statistics and jointly significant according to a likelihood ratio test, 
denoted LR statistic. The restrictions placed on the general model to obtain the parsimonious 
model cannot be rejected according to a likelihood ratio test [LR(general→favoured)]. The 
favoured parsimonious models will yield more efficient inference relative to the general 
model and so they are used for inference. 
The model in the column headed “No shift” in Table 1 contains no coefficients that shift 
for “new” EU countries (all the coefficients are the same for all countries). In the favoured 
                                                 
8 This happened for the liquidity index where for one country, Luxembourg, the value in the index could take on 
one of two values: –1.046 or 2.589. We used the index that produced the best fit in our experiments, being the 
value (–1.046) corresponding to the 998th iteration. See Figure 2 for a plot of the 998th and 999th iteration of the 
index for this variable’s index. 
9 The indices for assets, operating expenses to operating income and other operating income to assets converge 
completely by the 999th iteration. The indices for equity, net interest margin and return on assets almost 
completely converge by the 999th iteration.  
10 In this method we first delete all variables with z-statistics below one (or, exceptionally, 0.5 if the z-statistics 
are very small for a large number of variables) and apply a Likelihood Ratio (LR) test relative to the general 
model. If the restrictions cannot be rejected, we delete all variables with z-statistics below 1.5 and then all 
explanatory factors with z-statistics below 1.96 (applying all LR tests relative to the general model). If any LR 
test for joint restrictions is rejected, we experiment to find the variable(s) that cause this rejection and retain it 
(them) in the model.  
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model all the significant coefficients have plausible signs. That is, liquidity has a positive 
effect on ratings: banks with greater liquidity have a higher rating; the natural log of assets 
has a positive effect on ratings: banks with a larger size of assets have a higher rating; the net 
interest margin ( )NIM  has a positive correlation with ratings: a bank with a higher margin 
has a higher rating.11 Further, operating expenses to operating income ( )OIOE _  has a 
negative correlation with a bank’s rating: a bank with a greater ratio of operating expenses to 
operating income has a lower rating. This benchmark model’s percentage of correct 
predictions is 33.6% which exceeds the predictive accuracy of 10% (given 10 rating 
categories) expected if the ratings were assigned randomly. Hence, the model adds predictive 
performance that is 22.6 percentage points greater than that obtained by chance.  
 The favoured model in the column headed “Intercept shift” in Table 1 contains the 
intercept dummy variable that shifts for “new” EU countries, NewiD , but no slope coefficient 
shift variables. The same financial variables as for the “No shift” model are significant and 
have the same plausible coefficient signs, while the shift in the intercept is significant and 
negatively signed. The latter implies that, given the financial variables, “new” EU countries 
receive a systematically lower rating than “old EU” countries. This may reflect, for example, 
higher country risk and/or regulatory and legal deficiencies in “new” EU countries and 
confirms our hypothesis that the country of origin is an important determinant of a bank’s 
rating. This model’s percentage of correct predictions of is 37.4%, thus allowing the intercept 
to shift notably increases the model’s predictive performance.12  
 The favoured model in the column headed “All shift” contains variables that allow both 
the intercept and slope coefficients to shift depending upon whether the nation is an “old” EU 
or “new” EU country. Six “non-shift” variables are significant (equity, liquidity, ln(Assets), 
NIM, OE_OI and ROA) and their coefficients represent these variable’s correlations with 
ratings for “old” EU countries. Seven of the “shift” variables are significant (intercept, equity, 
liquidity, ln(Assets), NIM, OOIA and ROA) which indicates that the influence of these 
variables on ratings is different for “new” EU countries and “old” EU countries.13 The 
model’s percentage of correct predictions is 39.6% and demonstrates that allowing slopes to 
                                                 
11 A high NIM contributes to a bank’s profitability and enables them to build up sufficient reserves/provisions 
for potential losses. 
12 The other reported measures of fit, pseudo 2R  and SBC, confirm this increase in fit and, being broader 
measures of fit, guard against the result arising because the former measure focuses only on whether a model 
predicts with complete accuracy or not. 
13 The likelihood ratio statistics indicate that these shift variables are jointly significant, confirming that the 
coefficients for “old” and “new” EU countries are different for all of these variables. 
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shift as well as the intercept further increases the model’s predictive performance.14 The 
negative coefficient on the intercept shift term suggests that, as for the previous model, “new” 
EU countries have systematically lower ratings than “old” EU countries after the effects of 
financial variables have been taken into account. Further, the significance of the slope shift 
variables’ coefficients demonstrates that bank ratings responses to financial variables are 
different for “old” and “new” EU countries.  
 Table 2 reports the slope coefficients and t-ratios for “old” and “new” EU countries 
implied by the models reported in Table 1. From the results corresponding to the favoured 
specification 5 of the 6 significant coefficients have the expected signs for the “old” EU 
countries. An increase in liquidity, assets, net interest margin and return on assets will have a 
positive impact on ratings whereas an increase in operating expenses relative to operating 
income has a negative effect on ratings. All of these relations are plausibly signed. However, 
the negative correlation of equity and ratings is unexpected. One possible rationalisation is 
that banks use equity to create a buffer against possible loss or non-performing assets.15 Thus, 
a higher equity to assets ratio may indicate potential problems with asset quality, which is 
reflected in a lower rating.16  
 For “new” EU countries 3 of the 4 significant coefficients of the favoured model reported 
in Table 2 have the expected signs. Increases in assets and operating income to assets have a 
positive impact on ratings whilst an increase in operating expenses relative to operating 
income has a negative effect on ratings. In contrast, the negative correlation of return on 
assets with a bank’s rating is not expected.17 However, the coefficient is only just significant 
and may be due to a Type-I error (of which there is a 5% chance given our chosen 
significance level). Indeed, this finding of a positive coefficient on return on assets is not 
repeated in any other regressions and may, therefore, be regarded as a fragile result. 
 The results of the favoured model reported in Table 2 provide clear evidence that ratings 
are determined differently for “old” and “new” EU countries. The coefficient for “new” EU 
countries is significantly larger than for “old” EU countries for equity, assets and operating 
income. Conversely, the coefficient for “new” EU countries is significantly smaller than for 
                                                 
14 The other reported measures of fit, pseudo 2R  and SBC, confirm this increase in fit. 
15 Until recently (before the crisis) equity (or capitalisation) was not a problem in banking. 
16 In transition economies it has been essential that banks build up high equity because of higher risk, although 
we do not find a negative correlation between ratings and equity for “new” EU countries.  
17 Return on assets is an indicator of profitability. In this specific case high profitability can be considered as a 
weakness that is associated with imprudent lending policies. In other words, a high profit may result from 
reckless lending. This would be especially relevant for “new” EU countries.  
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“old” EU countries for liquidity, net interest margin and return on assets. Only for operating 
expenses to operating income are the coefficients the same for “old” and “new” EU countries. 
 Table 3 reports results where a heterogeneous intercept and slopes (for the financial 
covariates) are allowed for all countries and not just for the “new” and “old” EU country 
groupings. The models reported in the column headed “Intercept heterogeneity” contain the 
intercept country index but no country indices for the covariates’ slopes. From the favoured 
model we see that all significant coefficients have expected signs except equity. Date, 
liquidity, assets, net interest margin and operating income have plausible positive effects on 
ratings while operating expenses has a plausible negative correlation with a bank’s rating. As 
before, equity has an unexpected negative impact on ratings suggesting that this may not be a 
fragile result.18 It is particularly noteworthy that the intercept country index is highly 
significant and its inclusion in the model raises the model’s percentage of correct predictions 
substantially compared with previous models to 48.0%.19 This suggests that country-specific 
factors, beyond those captured by financial covariates, are very important determinants of 
ratings.  
 The models reported in the column headed “All heterogeneity” of Table 3 contain both 
heterogeneous intercept and slope indices. The same non-index covariates as reported in the 
favoured model under the “Intercept heterogeneity” column are significant, except for Date, 
and have the same coefficient signs. The index variables that are significant are for the 
intercept, liquidity and operating expenses: these are the only variables that exhibit 
coefficient heterogeneity. The percentage of correct predictions is 50.5%, which suggests that 
adding covariate indices (giving slope heterogeneity) raises the predictive performance by 2.5 
percentage points relative to the model only allowing intercept heterogeneity.  
 The values of the intercept coefficients from the intercept country index are given in 
Table 4. All of the countries have different intercepts, indicating that all countries’ ratings 
contain a country-specific element. All of the “old” EU countries have larger intercepts than 
the “new” EU countries, indicating that country-specific factors lower “new” EU countries’ 
ratings relative to “old” EU nations, which confirms our initial hypothesis. However, it is 
worth emphasising that within “old” and “new” EU country groupings there is intercept 
heterogeneity. Hence, factors such as sovereign risk and country differences in the legal and 
                                                 
18 A higher equity to assets ratio may be an indication of potential problems with asset quality which is reflected 
in a lower rating.  
19 This intercept index variable substantially improves predictive performance relative to a model with no 
heterogeneity or shifts by 14.4 percentage points. The model headed “Intercept heterogeneity” in Table 3’s 
predictive performance is 48.0% compared with the model headed “No shift” in Table 1 of 33.6%.  
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regulatory frameworks in which banks specifically operate affect the ratings at the individual 
country level. Whilst we confirm that “new” EU countries have lower ratings than “old” EU 
countries (after controlling for financial variables) our results emphasise that ratings do not 
simply differ by “old” and “new” EU country cohorts. 
 The country-specific coefficients for the liquidity and operating expenses to operating 
income variables are reported in Table 5. All of the countries’ coefficients have the expected 
signs, except for Romania’s liquidity coefficient which is relatively small in magnitude, being 
virtually zero. With the exception of Romania (and Spain) “new” EU countries tend to have 
larger coefficients for both variables compared with “old” EU countries. Further, ratings tend 
to be more sensitive to liquidity for “new” EU countries relative to “old” EU countries, while 
ratings tend to be less responsive to operating expenses to operating income for “new” EU 
countries compared with “old” EU countries. Whilst there is some heterogeneity for both 
variables, many coefficients are the same. That is, for 16 out of 27 countries the coefficients 
are the same for liquidity and for 13 out of 27 countries they are the same for operating 
expenses. We note that only two financial variables show coefficient heterogeneity and 
within these variables many of the different countries are the same, which contrasts with the 
intercept index which indicates a different index for all countries. It therefore appears that the 
main country heterogeneity comes from the intercept variable and only a small part comes 
from the different country responses of ratings to financial variables. 
 Further, recall that the predictive performance of the benchmark model containing no 
heterogeneous (or shifting) coefficients is 33.6%. Thus, the incorporation of a heterogeneous 
intercept increases this performance by 14.4 percentage points to 48.0%. Adding indices for 
both heterogeneous slopes and a heterogeneous intercept raises the model’s predictive 
accuracy to 50.5%, which is a relatively modest increase of 2.5 percentage points (compared 
with the model containing a heterogeneous intercept). This suggests that most of the 
improvement in fit comes from adding a heterogeneous intercept and only a small percentage 
from the addition of heterogeneous slopes. Thus, the heterogeneous intercept appears to be a 
crucial determinant of ratings. 
 
4. Conclusions 
 
 Our models of EU country ratings show that ratings are determined by financial variables 
and that these covariates have the expected coefficient signs except for equity. We suggest 
that the explanation for this latter result may be that a higher equity to assets ratio can be an 
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indication of potential problems with asset quality which is reflected in a lower rating. 
Country-specific factors (in the form of heterogeneous intercepts) are a crucial determinant of 
ratings. Whilst “new” EU countries typically have lower ratings than “old” EU countries, 
after controlling for financial variables, it should be emphasised that all countries have 
significantly different intercepts – this confirms our initial hypothesis. This intercept 
heterogeneity may reflect differences in country risk and the legal and regulatory framework 
that banks face (such as foreclosure laws).  
 There may be some differences across countries in the assignment of ratings due to the 
liquidity and operating expenses to operating income variables. There is some evidence that 
ratings are typically more responsive to liquidity and less sensitive to operating expenses for 
“new” EU countries compared with “old” EU countries. However, it is clear that the primary 
country heterogeneity in ratings arises from the intercept rather than from the slopes. 
Construction of slope heterogeneity indices is a novel development in the methodology of 
constructing index-of-indicator variables.  
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Table 1: Bank ratings probit regressions with new EU coefficient shift  
 
 No shift New EU intercept 
shift 
New EU intercept 
and slope shift 
Variables  
(expected sign) 
Gen Fav Gen Fav Gen Fav 
Date  –0.002 
(–0.229) 
 0.014 
(1.276) 
 0.018 
(1.509) 
 
1−tEquity                (+) –0.572 (–0.631) 
 –1.237 
(–1.023) 
 –4.216 
(–2.277) 
–4.047 
(–2.252) 
1−tLiquidity            (+) 1.301 (8.049) 
1.327 
(8.354) 
1.285 
(7.358) 
1.336 
(7.714) 
1.118 
(5.735) 
1.143 
(5.946) ( ) 1ln −tAssets           (+) 0.243 (14.430) 0.249 (15.683) 0.177 (8.332) 0.183 (9.030) 0.181 (6.944) 0.181 (6.929) 
1−tNIM               (–/+) 1.672 (1.560) 
1.867 
(2.115) 
5.694 
(4.493) 
5.721 
(4.780) 
6.052 
(4.032) 
5.702 
(3.953) 
1_ −tOIOE               (–) –1.461 (–10.680) 
–1.547 
(–13.917) 
–1.342 
(–6.874) 
–1.517 
(–8.748) 
–1.119 
(–5.615) 
–1.182 
(–6.172) 
1−tOOIA                    (+) –13.388 (–1.693) 
 8.993 
(1.271) 
 –5.319 
(–0.476) 
 
1−tROA                      (+) 4.593 (1.110) 
 8.725 
(1.355) 
 43.807 
(4.000) 
42.302 
(3.976) 
NewIntercept _    –1.548 
(–14.163) 
–1.485 
(–14.455) 
–0.983 
(–1.609) 
–1.356 
(–2.674) 
1_ −tNewEquity      7.039 (2.989) 
6.681 
(2.902) 
1_ −tNewLiquidity      –1.350 (–2.870) 
–1.478 
(–3.273) ( ) 1_ln −tNewAssets      0.127 (2.801) 0.121 (2.790) 
1_ −tNewNIM      –6.814 (–2.778) 
–7.571 
(–3.231) 
1__ −tNewOIOE      –0.637 (–1.126) 
 
 
1_ −tNewOOIA      33.272 (2.469) 
24.723 
(3.546) 
1_ −tNewROA      –59.774 (–4.291) 
–50.554 
(–4.735) 
Fit Measures       
% correct 33.390 33.647 37.158 37.414 39.555 39.555 
Pseudo 2R   0.096 0.095 0.142 0.140 0.160 0.159 
SBC 3.354 3.334 3.197 3.179 3.176 3.161 
LR statistic 405.272 
[0.000] 
401.090 
[0.000] 
596.398 
[0.000] 
588.520 
[0.000] 
670.413 
[0.000] 
666.545 
[0.000] 
LR(general→favoured)  4.183 
[0.382] 
 7.879 
[0.096] 
 3.869 
[0.276] 
LR(slope shift)     74.015 
[0.000] 
73.218 
[0.000] 
LR(slope/intercept shift)     265.141 
[0.000] 
264.186 
[0.000] 
Observations 1168 1168 1168 1168 1168 1168 
Table 1 notes. The dependent variable is a bank’s rating which has ten categories that correspond to the integer values in the range of 1 to 
10 and yields nine limit points, 9 ,...,2 ,1  , =iiλ  (the intercept is not separately identified from the limit points). Z-statistics (in 
parentheses) are based upon Huber-White standard errors and the percentage of correct predictions (% correct) use the category with the 
highest probability to give the predicted rating. Also reported are the Pseudo 2R  and Schwartz’s information criterion, SBC. Likelihood 
ratio tests for the model’s explanatory power, LR Statistic, the deletion of variables from the general model to obtain the parsimonious 
model, LR(general→favoured) the deletion of slope shift variables, LR(slope shift), and the deletion of slope and intercept shift variables, 
LR(slope/intercept shift) from a model are additionally reported. Probability values are given in square parentheses. All regressions were 
estimated using E-Views 6.0. 
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Table 2: Implied slope coefficients and t-ratios of EU shift models  
 
 General Favoured 
Variables (expected sign) Old EU New EU Old EU New EU 
Date  0.018 
(1.509) 
   
1−tEquity                 (+) –4.216 
(–2.277)* 
2.823 
(1.917) 
–4.047 
(–2.252)* 
2.634 
(1.829) 
1−tLiquidity             (+) 1.118 
(5.735)* 
–0.232 
(–0.542) 
1.143 
(5.946)* 
–0.336 
(–0.818) ( ) 1ln −tAssets            (+) 0.181 
(6.944)* 
0.309 
(7.773)* 
0.181 
(6.929)* 
0.302 
(8.067)* 
1−tNIM                  (–/+) 6.052 
(4.032)* 
–0.762 
(–0.378) 
5.702 
(3.953)* 
–1.869 
(–1.011) 
1_ −tOIOE               (–) –1.119 
(–5.615)* 
–1.756 
–(3.208)* 
–1.182 
(–6.172)* 
–1.182 
(–6.172)* 
1−tOOIA                   (+) –5.319 
(–0.476) 
27.953 
(3.684)* 
 24.723 
(3.546)* 
1−tROA                     (+) 43.807 
(4.000)* 
–15.967 
(–1.890) 
42.302 
(3.976)* 
–8.251 
(–1.991)* 
Table 2 notes. The (implied) coefficients and t-ratios are reported for new EU and old EU countries based upon 
the general and favoured regressions reported in Table 1 under the column headed “New EU intercept and slope 
shift”. The coefficients and t-ratios for the old EU countries are exactly the same as those reported in Table 1. 
The coefficients for new EU countries are the sum of the coefficients on the variable of interest and its 
corresponding shift term. The t-ratios for new EU countries are calculated based upon the variance of the sum of 
a particular variable’s coefficient (a) and its corresponding shift variable’s coefficient (b), that is, Var(a + b) = 
Var(a)  + Var(b) + 2Cov(ab). An asterix indicates that a variable is significant at the 5% level (using a critical 
value of 1.96 in absolute value). 
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Table 3: Bank ratings probit regressions with country heterogeneity 
 
 Intercept heterogeneity Intercept and slope 
heterogeneity 
Variables (expected sign) Gen Fav Gen Fav 
Date  0.026 
(2.489) 
0.026 
(2.448) 
0.022 
(1.714) 
 
1−tEquity                (+) –3.447 
(–3.704) 
–3.142 
(–3.537) 
–3.518 
(–2.770) 
–3.272 
(–2.723) 
1−tLiquidity            (+) 0.541 
(3.212) 
0.569 
(3.424) 
0.380 
(1.903) 
0.426 
(2.370) ( ) 1ln −tAssets           (+) 0.233 
(13.367) 
0.234 
(13.461) 
0.297 
(9.256) 
0.290 
(9.248) 
1−tNIM                  (–/+) 4.845 
(4.402) 
5.219 
(4.987) 
3.741 
(2.968) 
3.539 
(3.176) 
1_ −tOIOE              (–) –1.237 
(–8.795) 
–1.324 
(–11.365) 
–1.354 
(–5.884) 
–1.418 
(–7.434) 
1−tOOIA                   (+) 19.053 
(2.329) 
20.178 
(2.486) 
14.911 
(2.022) 
17.271 
(2.551) 
1−tROA                     (+) 4.621 
(1.101) 
 0.946 
(0.162) 
 
CountryIntercept _  1.065 
(24.159) 
1.065 
(24.159) 
1.065 
(19.883) 
1.056 
(22.507) 
1_ −tCountryEquity    0.00004 
(1.570) 
 
1_ −tCountryLiquidity    0.135 
(1.161) 
0.299 
(3.332) ( ) 1_ln −tCountryAssets    2.166 
(1.294) 
 
1_ −tCountryNIM    –0.00003 
(–1.088) 
 
1__ −tCountryOIOE    0.217 
(1.964) 
0.224 
(2.475) 
1_ −tCountryOOIA    –0.0001 
(–0.201) 
 
1_ −tCountryROA    –0.000001 
(–0.768) 
 
Fit Measures     
% correct 48.116 48.031 50.086 50.514 
Pseudo 2R   0.248 0.248 0.261 0.259 
SBC 2.815 2.810 2.812 2.777 
LR statistic 1042.631 
[0.000] 
1041.420 
[0.000] 
1095.051 
[0.000] 
1086.883 
[0.000] 
LR(general→favoured)  1.211 
[0.271] 
 8.168 
[0.318] 
LR(slope heterogeneity)   52.420 
[0.000] 
51.460 
[0.000] 
LR(slope/intercept heterogeneity)   689.779 
[0.000] 
682.916 
[0.000] 
Observations 1168 1168 1168 1168 
Table 3 notes. The dependent variable is a bank’s rating which has ten categories that correspond to the integer values in the range of 1 to 
10 and yields nine limit points, 9 ,...,2 ,1  , =iiλ  (the intercept is not separately identified from the limit points). Z-statistics (in 
parentheses) are based upon Huber-White standard errors and the percentage of correct predictions (% correct) use the category with the 
highest probability to give the predicted rating. Also reported are the Pseudo 2R  and Schwartz’s information criterion, SBC. Likelihood 
ratio tests for the model’s explanatory power, LR Statistic, the deletion of variables from the general model to obtain the parsimonious 
model, LR(general→*) the deletion of slope shift country variables, LR(slope heterogeneity), and the deletion of slope and intercept country 
variables, LR(slope/intercept heterogeneity) from a model are additionally reported. Probability values are given in square parentheses. The 
variables corresponding to the country shift are all determined after 999 iterations except the one for liquidity, which alternated between two 
different forms, we used the form corresponding to the 998th iteration. All regressions were estimated using E-Views 6.0. 
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Table 4: Heterogeneous intercept (country weights) 
 
Country Weight Country Weight 
Old EU New EU 
Luxembourg 3.493 Estonia 0.653
Netherlands 2.527 Slovakia 0.590
UK 2.485 Malta 0.570
Denmark 2.450 Hungary 0.344
Spain 2.357 Cyprus 0.338
Sweden 2.137 Slovenia 0.284
Ireland 2.098 Czech R -0.172
Portugal 1.851 Poland -0.196
Finland 1.723 Bulgaria -0.204
Belgium 1.559 Romania -0.211
Austria 1.440 Lithuania -0.227
Italy 1.263 Latvia -0.601
France 1.182
Germany 0.727
Greece 0.670
Table 4 notes. The coefficient of the individual countries embodied in the index of indicators 
variable, CountryIntercept _ , are given. The coefficients are ranked from highest to lowest 
value.  
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Table 5: Heterogeneous slopes 
 
Liquidity  Oe_oi 
Malta 0.900  Sweden -1.696 
Lithuania 0.836  Denmark -1.695 
Latvia 0.802  Finland -1.647 
Bulgaria 0.676  Romania -1.642 
Slovenia 0.620  Germany -1.601 
Spain 0.533  Austria -1.591 
Austria   France -1.587 
Belgium   Italy -1.577 
Cyprus   Belgium 
Czech Republic   Cyprus 
Estonia   Czech Republic 
Finland   Estonia 
France   Greece 
Greece   Ireland 
Hungary   Luxembourg 
Ireland   Netherlands 
Italy   Poland 
Netherlands   Portugal 
Poland   Slovakia 
Portugal   Spain 
Slovakia   UK 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-1.418 
 
UK  
0.426
 Slovenia -1.283 
Sweden 0.276  Bulgaria -1.215 
Denmark 0.198  Lithuania -1.194 
Germany 0.132  Malta -1.191 
Luxembourg 0.114  Hungary -1.184 
Romania -0.057  Latvia -1.170 
Table 5 notes. The coefficients for each individual country implied by the financial 
variables’ parameters and the index of indicator variables, 1_ −tCountryLiquidity  and 
1__ −tCountryOIOE , are given. These are constructed as the coefficient on the k
th variable, 
kβˆ , and the product of the kth variable’s index, CFkiI , and its associated coefficient, CFkβˆ , that 
is, as, CFki
CF
kk Iββ ˆˆ + . The coefficients are ranked from the highest to lowest value for liquidity 
and lowest to highest for operating expenses to operating income.  
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Figure 1: Equity Index Iterations 
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Figure 1 notes: slope_dum_equity_998 and slope_dum_equity_999 are the 998th and 999th 
iterations of the equity index. 
 
Figure 2: Equity Index Iterations 
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Figure 2 notes: slope_dum_liq_998 and slope_dum_liq_999 are the 998th and 999th iterations 
of the liquidity index. 
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Figure 3: Assets Index Iterations 
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Figure 3 notes: slope_dum_lnassets_998 and slope_dum_lnassets_999 are the 998th and 
999th iterations of the assets index. 
 
Figure 4: NIM Index Iterations 
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Figure 4 notes: slope_dum_nim_998 and slope_dum_nim_999 are the 998th and 999th 
iterations of the NIM index. 
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Figure 5: OE_OI Index Iterations 
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Figure 5 notes: slope_dum_oe_oi_998 and slope_dum_oe_oi_999 are the 998th and 999th 
iterations of the operating expenses to operating income index. 
 
Figure 6: OOIA Index Iterations 
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Figure 6 notes: slope_dum_ooia_998 and slope_dum_ooia_999 are the 998th and 999th 
iterations of the other operating income to assets index. 
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Figure 7: ROA Index Iterations 
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Figure 7 notes: slope_dum_roa_998 and slope_dum_roa_999 are the 998th and 999th 
iterations of the return on assets index. 
 
